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Abstract: The Pessimistic Induction (PI) is the following argument: most of our past scientific theories have been radically mistaken; therefore, our current theories are probably similarly mistaken.  But mistaken in what way?  On the usual interpretation of the PI, our past theories are false—and therefore, our present ones are probably also false.  I argue instead that, on widely-held semantic views about reference, presupposition, and ‘open texture’ concepts, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false.  And if substantial chunks of our past theories lack truth-values, then the upshot of the PI is semantic anti-realism.  But most philosophers of science today consider semantic anti-realism unacceptable.  So PI proponents face an unpalatable choice: accept either semantic anti-realism, or a substantial, unorthodox semantic position.

1.  Introduction.  The simplest version of the pessimistic induction (PI) is the following inductive argument:
All (or Most) of our past (fundamental) scientific theories are not approximately true—even the ones empirically successful in their time.			
Therefore, it is likely that all (or most) of our current (fundamental) scientific theories are not approximately true—even the ones empirically successful now.
Realists have offered substantive, sophisticated replies this argument.  Two leading responses are: (i) the inductive base is not representative, so that current theories are, in relevant respects, different from previous ones (Hardin and Rosenberg 1982, 610ff.).  (ii) The parts of superseded theories responsible for their empirical success were (approximately) true.  For example, Kitcher differentiates a theory’s ‘working posits’ from its ‘idle wheels’ (1993, 149) (Psillos (1999, 110) advocates a similar view).  We are licensed, such a realist maintains, to believe in those posits that generate empirical success, but not the remainder of the theory (the ‘idle wheels’).  These realist maneuvers have generated anti-realist responses.  For example, Kyle Stanford (2006, chapters 6-7) argues that the distinctions in (i) and (ii) cannot be drawn in a way that simultaneously respects the historical record and saves the realist’s core position.  Hasok Chang (2003) also contests (ii), arguing that it was precisely false assumptions about caloric that served as the ‘working posits’ allowing the derivation of empirically successful theories of heat.
	I will not comment on these familiar debates over the pessimistic induction.  I shall bracket questions about how well the historical record, in whole or part, supports or undermines the conclusion of the pessimistic induction.  If the pessimistic induction exerts no persuasive force on you, nothing said here should change your mind.  Rather, I will challenge a standard understanding of the pessimistic induction, which holds that the fundamental claims of bygone scientific theories are false.​[1]​  I suggest instead that, on views about the language-world relation that are common (though not universal), many of the fundamental hypotheses of discarded past theories are truth-valueless, i.e. neither true nor false.  Why? In the graveyard of superseded science, we find theories whose fundamental claims exhibit certain types of anomaly, such as reference failure, presupposition failure, and/ or partially-defined predicates.  On many leading semantic views, some or all of these anomalies lead to sentences that are neither true nor false. Thus, if one accepts these standard semantic views, and accepts (with the proponent of the PI) that present theories are relevantly similar to past ones, then one must accept that certain fundamental claims of our present theories probably lack truth-values too.
	But, one might ask, why does it matter whether one thinks of past theories as false or truth-valueless?  Because the PI proponent who considers past theories truth-valueless is committed to a type of scientific anti-realism—semantic anti-realism—that is extremely unpopular today.​[2]​  Semantic anti-realism contrasts with the most popular versions of recent scientific anti-realism, which follow van Fraassen in adopting semantic realism about theoretical discourse and an epistemological anti-realism.  On this view, claims about unobservables have definite truth-values, but we limited beings do not know what those truth-values are.  My aim here is to argue that the pessimistic induction, when joined to currently dominant views about language, instead supports semantic anti-realism about science.
	Before delving into the details, let us consider two relatively simple and well-known illustrative examples, which will motivate the suggestion that past theories contain truth-valueless claims.  Within classical mechanics, sentences of the form ‘Body b has absolute velocity v0’​[3]​ are perfectly normal.  For example, a Newtonian physicist could claim that the Sun has a particular absolute velocity.  Now, from a relativistic point of view, the claim
(1) 	vSun = 0 
(colloquially, ‘The sun is at absolute rest’) involves some sort of mistake.  In particular, we moderns say that there is no such thing as absolute velocity, so it is incorrect to attribute an absolute velocity of 0 to the sun.  So sentence (1) is definitely not true. But now consider the negation of (1), namely:
(2)	vSun  0		
From the relativistic point of view, this also appears untrue, since the Sun does not have some other absolute velocity distinct from 0.  Since neither (1) nor (2) appear to be true, the prima facie conclusion would be that they are both false.  
However, taking both (1) and (2) to be false spells disaster, for then there would be a pair of sentences of the form A and ‘not-A’ that are both false.  But the only way a pair of sentences of the form A and ‘not-A’ can both be false is if A is both true and false; in short, declaring both (1) and (2) false will land us in a contradiction. And although Priest argues that there are true contradictions, even he holds that a sentence’s being both true and false provides very strong (though defeasible) reason to reject it, and that true contradictions appear only under quite rare and special circumstances, e.g. the liar sentence (1998).  To respect the intuition that neither (1) nor (2) is true, it seems we should say that both are truth-valueless.
	Consider another simple and familiar example: the concept of temporal precedence in pre-relativistic spacetime theories, viewed from a modern, relativistic viewpoint.  Suppose we have two events e1 and e2 that are spacelike related (that is, no signal can pass between them).  Now imagine a Newtonian says: ‘e1 precedes e2.’  We relativists know that, for any two spacelike related events, (given a convention for simultaneity) there will be some frames of reference in which one precedes the other, and other frames in which the order is reversed.  That is, we recognize that temporal precedence is relative to a frame of reference, so there is something wrong with the Newtonian’s claim.  But for relativists, what is the truth-value of the pre-relativist’s claim?  Intuitively, it is not straightforwardly true or false.​[4]​  We could diagnose the reason for this truth-valuelessness in a number of ways: there is no genuine relation of temporal precedence, or the term ‘precedes’ is only partially defined (its extension and anti-extension do not exhaust the set of ordered pairs of spacetime points), or the sentence incorrectly presupposes the existence of a global temporal ordering of spacetime points independent of frames of reference.  The particular diagnosis is not important for the ultimate purpose of this paper, so long as the Newtonian’s sentence lacks a truth-value when the events mentioned are spacelike separated.
	Before proceeding, a basic objection should be addressed.  One might agree that certain parts of discarded past theories (such as the two examples just considered) are truth-valueless, but object that past theories as wholes are false.  In particular, superseded theories’ observational predictions that fall outside the acceptable range of error when checked against experiment are unequivocally false.  I accept this.  The objector then continues: ‘If theories are conjunctions of claims, and predictions are claims a theory makes, then the whole theory must be false, since a conjunction with one false conjunct is false.’  First, for the theory as a whole to be false instead of truth-valueless, one must accept (an analogue​[5]​ of) the strong Kleene scheme instead of the weak one;​[6]​ so, a justification for using the strong Kleene scheme is needed to justify considering the whole theory false.  Second, and more importantly, regardless of which Kleene scheme one uses, some portions of the historical theories discussed in the realism debate make truth-valueless claims.  That is, many individual conjuncts of a theory could still be truth-valueless, and thus, if one accepts the pessimistic induction, many individual conjuncts of our present theories are likely truth-valueless—a conclusion which would still be very unwelcome for most philosophers of science today.  Section 2 argues that, on widely-held semantic views, reference failure leads to truth-valueless sentences, and that many of the errors of superseded scientific theories are instances of reference failure.  Section 3 does the same for presupposition failure and partially-defined (i.e. vague) predicates.
	
2. Designation Failure.  Various philosophers have suggested that several types of declarative claim are neither true nor false; purportedly truth-valueless claims include inter alia future contingents, paradoxical sentences, and category mistakes.  More importantly for present purposes, many claim that sentences containing certain noun phrases that fail to designate are also neither true nor false.  This view comes in various flavors, which I shall outline presently, but first I will provide a brief account of how ‘designation’ is meant here.  First, ‘designation’ covers not only the relationship between singular terms and the objects that bear them, but also the relation between natural kind terms and natural kinds.  For example, on this understanding of ‘designation,’ the terms ‘Planet Vulcan’ and ‘caloric’ both fail to designate.​[7]​  Second, designation failure comes in two forms: under-designation, when the term picks out no entity, and over-designation, when the term picks out more than one entity.  For example, ‘Vulcan’ and ‘phlogiston’ both under-designate.  We find an instance of over-designation for kind terms in an example popularized in (Field 1973): in special relativity, we can define ‘mass’ in two ways: either as total energy/ c2 (relativistic mass) or as non-kinetic energy/ c2 (proper or rest mass).  Field suggests that the kind term ‘mass’ in Newtonian writings partially designates proper mass, and partially designates relativistic mass.​[8]​  So Newton’s ‘mass’ fails to designate, since it fails to pick out a single entity.  Another, less discussed example of over-designation is found in taxonomy.  The term ‘prokaryote,’ introduced as a natural kind term applying to any organism that was not a eukaryote, actually designates two distinct natural kinds: eubacteria and archaebacteria.  (Eubacteria and archaebacteria are at least as genetically distant from one another as each taxon is from the eukaryotes.)  ‘Prokaryote’ fails to designate a single natural kind; it partially designates eubacteria, and partially designates archaebacteria.  In short, designation failure comes in different forms: for singular terms and natural kind terms, as well as for under-designating and over-designating terms. 
	Why hold that a sentence with non-designating categorematic terms lack a truth-value?  This is a difficult and far-reaching philosophical question, and cannot be fully addressed here.  I will only provide a brief answer, since our ultimate purposes lie elsewhere.  To motivate this view, let us take a simple case: an atomic sentence Fa, where a is a name and F is a predicate.  Here is an intuitive semantic account for such sentences: Fa is true iff the object picked out by a determinately​[9]​ has the property picked out by F, and Fa is false iff the object picked out by a determinately lacks the property picked out by F.  But what if either a or F fail to pick out anything (determinately)?  Then neither the condition for truth nor the condition for falsity is met.  For example, ‘Vulcan orbits the Sun’ is definitely not true.  Nonetheless, it does not meet the characterization of falsity given above; it is not what we might call a ‘garden variety’ falsehood—and its not being ‘garden variety,’ I think, persists in more sophisticated semantic views.   This is not meant as an irrefragable justification of the view that atomic sentences containing non-designating terms are neither true nor false; it is only an attempt to articulate and motivate a view of truth and falsity that many share. 
	A more principled justification for the claim that designation failure leads to truth-value gaps is available.  The two leading theories of semantic content for designating expressions are the Direct Reference Theory (DRT) and Fregeanism.​[10]​  Each of these entails that atomic sentences with non-referring names or natural kind terms are truth-valueless.  Thus a PI proponent prima facie faces an unpleasant dilemma: reject leading semantic views, or accept semantic anti-realism.  Let us consider these two semantic theories in turn, showing how designation failure leads to truth-value gaps.
Direct reference theory holds that:
(DRT: names) The semantic content of a name (if any) is the object (if any) to which the name refers.
(DRT: kind terms) The semantic content of a natural kind term (if any) is the property or kind (if any) to which the natural kind term refers.
(DRT: sentences)  The semantic content, if any, of a sentence containing a name (resp. natural kind term) includes the object (resp. natural kind), if any, to which that name (resp. natural kind term) refers.
Accepting DRT clearly pushes you to the view that certain sentences with non-referring terms lack truth-value: a term that fails to refer will express no semantic content.  Thus a sentence containing such a term will be ‘infected,’ so to speak, and will also fail to express a complete propositional content.  Some advocates of DRT embrace the ‘no proposition view’: sentences with non-designating categorematic terms express no proposition.  Russell (1986, 207-208), Kripke (1973, Lecture 2), and Donnellan (1974) hold this view.  Others opt for the milder ‘partial proposition view’: a sentence with a non-designating term expresses an incomplete proposition, and incomplete propositions lack a truth-value.  Sentences with non-designating terms are not nonsense, for they have some meaningful components that are combined appropriately, but those meaningful components nonetheless fail to generate something with a truth-value upon combination.  The view that partial propositions fail to have truth-values is elaborated and defended in (Taylor 2000), (Reimer 2001), and (Everett 2003), among others. 	
	Frege claimed that empty names have sense, but no reference.  And because both sense and reference are compositional, sentences containing empty names can express senses, yet have no reference, which for Frege is of course truth-value.  He writes:
The sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense.  But since it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’, occurring therein, has a Bedeutung, it is also doubtful whether the whole sentence does. (1892/1997, 157)
That is, ‘Odysseus fell asleep on the beach’ expresses a complete sense.  However, this sentence nonetheless has no truth-value, in agreement with the partial- and no-proposition views.  Thus, for Fregeans as well as direct reference theorists, if past scientific theories are replete with non-designating terms, then prima facie such theories contain sentences that are neither true nor false (because they express either a complete sense without a reference, a partial proposition, or no proposition at all).  Our earlier example of ‘vSun = 0’ is a clear example: there is no such kind as absolute velocity, and this designation failure leads to truth-valuelessness.  
But absolute velocity is not an isolated instance.  If we examine Laudan’s original list of scientific theories that were empirically successful but ultimately incorrect, the launching point for modern discussions of the PI, we find that he explicitly selects theories whose central terms prima facie fail to designate (Laudan 1981, 33).  For example: 
- ‘Respiration and combustion are easier in airs without phlogiston.’ 
- ‘Light waves propagate through the ether.’  
- ‘In any closed system, caloric is always conserved.’  
- ‘The entelechy of the sea urchin embryo differs from that of water hydrae.’  
- ‘Vulcan is between the Sun and Mercury.’
All these sentences contain non-designating terms.  None are true.  On the most straightforward understanding of both DRT and Fregeanism, the two leading semantic views based on the notions of truth and reference, these sentences lack a truth-value. 
	Note that I say ‘the most straightforward understanding of DRT and Fregeanism.’  Some proponents of these semantic theories are unhappy with the widespread truth-valuelessness their basic theory implies, and thus introduce various theoretical maneuvers to eliminate truth-value gaps.  There is a sizable literature on the subject, and the discussion has become multifaceted and subtle, so it cannot be explored here.  It suffices to note that these attempts to eliminate truth-value gaps often involve ad hoc elements introduced solely to ‘save’ partial propositions from being truth-valueless, or counter-intuitive consequences (e.g. if one holds that all atomic sentences with non-referring names are false, then ‘Vulcan=Vulcan’ is false, and even stranger, ‘VulcanVulcan’ is true).  But this is a rich and difficult debate, and it would be unfair to hold that none of these maneuvers could ultimately be successful.  I only insist upon one point: if the advocate of the PI holds that designation failure is common in the historical record, but wants to avoid semantic anti-realism, then she must make substantive, highly contested commitments in the philosophy of language.
	
3.  Other sources of truth-value gaps.  My main argument does not require that the semantically anomalous sentences found throughout the historical record of science involve designation failure; any mechanism that leads to truth-value gaps will do.  This section considers two other such mechanisms: presupposition failure and partially-defined predicates.
3.1.  Presupposition failure  
	Consider the following claim: ‘Joe stopped smoking yesterday.’  Intuitively, someone who utters this sentence takes for granted or presupposes that Joe has, at some past point in his life, been a smoker.  Why? If this sentence is true, then Joe was a smoker up until yesterday; if it is false, then apparently either Joe is still smoking, or Joe was a smoker up until a time earlier than yesterday.  So if either it is true or it is false, then Joe was a smoker at some point in the past.  If this description of the situation is correct, then we have an example of what is called a ‘semantic presupposition’: ‘Joe stopped smoking yesterday’ presupposes that Joe smoked at some earlier time.  This analysis fits the following canonical account:  
	S semantically presupposes P  if S is either true or false, then P is true.
In other words, if P is not true, then S is neither true nor false.  This characterization is intended to capture a fair amount of ‘intuitive’ presuppositions.  
Hopefully the similarity between ‘Joe stopped smoking yesterday’ and the examples from the historical graveyard of science is evident.  For example, consider the claim ‘Events e1 and e2 are simultaneous’ in a Newtonian’s mouth, where e1 and e2 are spacelike separated.  This claim apparently presupposes that there is a unique global time order, for without such, there is no standard of simultaneity that the two events can determinately meet—or fail to meet.  Similarly, ‘The sun is at (absolute) rest’ appears to presuppose that there is such a thing as absolute velocity, and that the sun has some absolute velocity or other.  For ‘The sun is at (absolute) rest’ is not straightforwardly true or false, if there is no such thing as absolute velocity.  For if I say that it is simply false, then I appear to be saying that the Sun has some other absolute velocity distinct from zero.  This example shows why reference failure is often thought of as a species of presupposition failure.​[11]​  I have separated the two cases, because people who have reservations about the semantic account of presupposition in general may nonetheless accept that reference failure in particular generates truth-value gaps. 
	Whether ‘intuitive’ or ‘felt’ presuppositions are best explained via the semantic account above is disputed, and has received an enormous amount of linguistic and philosophical attention (Atlas 1989; Burton-Roberts 1999; Carston 1999; Horn 1985).  This debate has become sophisticated and esoteric, so I will refrain from advancing any substantive claims about the contentious issues here.  However, although there is some suspicion about the coherence and applicability of the above semantic account of presupposition,​[12]​ nonetheless many semanticists forge ahead with their research agendas, which accept and use a semantic account of presupposition (e.g. (von Fintel 2004), (Lasersohn 2005), and the prominent textbook (Heim and Kratzer 1998)).  
	However, suppose one grants that the semantic account of presupposition above is inapplicable, or deficient for some other reason.  How do we then explain the felt difference between presuppositions and ‘normal’ entailments?  The usual answer is that presupposition should be understood as a pragmatic matter, not a semantic one.​[13]​  The pragmatic notion of presupposition is closer to the pretheoretical notion of a presupposition as something uncontroversially taken as recognized background knowledge in a communicative act.  
	How does pragmatic presupposition relate to the issue of truth-value gaps?  According to some, certain utterances exhibiting pragmatic presupposition failure fail to make genuine assertions at all—and thus such utterances would be neither true nor false, just like any other sounds emanating from a speaker’s mouth that fail to express propositions.  Jay Atlas, a critic of semantic presupposition, holds this view (1989, 86).  Michael Glanzberg agrees that some cases of pragmatic presupposition failure result in a failure to express a proposition (2005).  Thus, even those who deny that presupposition is best explained semantically can be committed to the view that utterances with failed presuppositions lack truth-values, since those utterances may fail to express any proposition.  Someone who holds such a pragmatic view of presupposition should be a semantic anti-realist about many of the fundamental claims of past scientists. 
3.2.  Partially-defined predicates.  
Sources other than presupposition or reference failure could possibly make historical scientific claims truth-valueless.  One such possibility is partially-defined predicates.​[14]​  If a property or relation is undefined over certain objects, it is reasonable to hold that an atomic sentence is truth-valueless if it expresses that that property holds of those certain objects.  This may be the best model for the previously discussed case of temporal predicates in the mouth of a Newtonian physicist.  That is, ‘e1 precedes e2’ has a truth-value for certain values of spacetime points e1 and e2—namely, for all causally related e1, e2.  Every ordered pair of events <e1, e2> such that e2 lies in the future-directed light-cone of e1 is in the extension of ‘e1 precedes e2’; and every ordered pair <e1, e2> such that e2 lies in the past-directed light-cone of e1 is in the predicate’s anti-extension.  However, any pair of events that cannot be connected by a causal signal is neither in the extension nor the anti-extension of ‘precedes’.  
	Some may think that partially-defined predicates are relatively scarce within the historical record.  Then, even if we admit that predicates like ‘precedes’ generate truth-valueless sentences, such linguistic items are so rare that only a miniscule portion of theoretical scientific discourse would become truth-valueless.  However, many philosophers of science hold that scientific terms exhibit what Waismann called ‘open texture’: there are cases in which it is not clear whether the term applies or not.  Put otherwise, the term is vague: its conditions of application are not exhaustive.  And one appealing way to formally model vagueness or open texture is via partially-defined predicates.  Vagueness, of course, has been the subject of intense and sustained study in Anglophone philosophy for the last fifteen years, and this attention has brought a welter of philosophical accounts of vagueness in its wake.  For present purposes, however, only two points from the literature are important: first, on many accounts of vagueness, certain sentences involving vague predicates (sentences about ‘borderline cases’) are neither true nor false.  Second, there appears to be good evidence that (from the point of view of our present linguistic practices) central terms of past scientific language are vague; Joseph LaPorte has forcefully argued for this point for terms such as ‘species,’ ‘mammal,’ and even ‘water’ (2004).  If certain sentences involving vague terms are neither true nor false, and our past scientific discourse is shot through with vague terms, then it seems that truth-valuelessness due to vagueness may appear throughout the historical record.  And if one accepts the supposition of the PI that present theories are relevantly similar to past ones, then this is a third way in which many of our theoretical claims today likely lack truth-values.  
	
5. Conclusion.  I have not argued for or against the PI.  My claim is that if you accept that
(i) present theories are relevantly similar to past ones, 
(ii) historical scientific claims exhibit significant designation failure, presupposition failure, and/or partially-defined predicates, and 
(iii) these three anomalies in (ii) lead to truth-valueless sentences, 





Atlas, Jay David (1989), Philosophy without Ambiguity.  Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Braun, David (1993), “Empty Names,” Nous 27, 449-469.

Burton-Roberts, Noel (1999), “Presupposition-Cancellation and Metalinguistic Negation,” Journal of Linguistics 35: 347-364.

Carston, Robyn (1999), “Negation, ‘presupposition’ and metarepresentation: A response to Noel Burton-Roberts.” Journal of Linguistics 35: 365-89.

Chang, Hasok (2003), “Preservative Realism and its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric,” Philosophy of Science 70: 902-912.

Donnellan, Keith (1974), “Speaking of Nothing,” Philosophical Review 83: 3-31.

Earman, John and Arthur Fine (1977), “Against Indeterminacy,” Journal of Philosophy 74: 535-538.

Everett, Anthony (2003), “Empty Names and ‘Gappy’ Propositions,” Philosophical Studies 116: 1-36.

Field, Hartry (1973), “Theory Change and Indeterminacy of Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 70: 462-481.

Frege, Gottlob (1892/1997), “On Sense and Reference,” in The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell.

Glanzberg, Michael (2005), “Presuppositions, Truth Values, and Expressing Propositions,” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 349-396.

Hardin, Clyde and Alexander Rosenberg (1982), “In Defense of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science 49: 604-615.

Heim, Irene and Angela Kratzer (1998), Semantics in Generative Grammar, Wiley-Blackwell.

Horn, Larry (1985), “Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity,” Language 61: 121-174.

Kitcher, Philip (1993), The Advancement of Science.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LaPorte, Joseph (2004), Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change.  New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lasersohn, Peter (2005), “The Temperature Paradox as Evidence for a Presuppositional Analysis of Definite Descriptions,” Linguistic Inquiry, 36: 127-134.

Laudan, Larry (1981), “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science 48: 19-49.

Priest, Graham (1998), “What’s So Bad About Contradictions?” Journal of Philosophy 95: 410-426.

Psillos, Stathis (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth.  New York: Routledge.

Reimer, Marga (2001), “The Problem of Empty Names,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79: 491-506.

Russell, Bertrand (1986), The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol.8 (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-1919).  John G. Slater (ed.).  London: Allen and Unwin.

Sankey, Howard (1991), “Incommensurability, Translation, and Understanding” Philosophical Quarterly 41: 414-426

Soames, Scott (1989), “Presupposition,” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic IV: Topics in the Philosophy of Language, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.): 553-616.  Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Stalnaker, Robert (1974), “Pragmatic Presuppositions,” in Semantics and Philosophy, M.K. Munitz and P.K. Unger (eds.), New York: New York University, 197-213

Stanford, P. Kyle (2006), Exceeding our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Ken (2000), “Emptiness without Compromise,” in Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-existence, Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.): 17-36.  Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.













^1	  For example: “while the history of science is a success story which is without parallel, it is in fact the history of good false theories which have been overthrown by better false theories” (Sankey 1991, 423); see also (Stanford 2006, 7).
^2	  Semantic anti-realism about theoretical science is distinct from the general semantic anti-realism of Dummett and his followers, who propose that the meaning of any sentence is its conditions of proof or verification, instead of its truth conditions.
^3	  I use normal quotation-marks ambiguously between corner-quotes and standard quotes.
^4	  Unless we assume that the word ‘before’ in a pre-relativist’s mouth should be understood as ‘before relative to my frame of reference.’  But this stretches credulity, given Newton’s comments about absolute time in the Principia.
^5	  It is only analogous, because having no truth-value is different from having a third truth-value.
^6	  Suppose that …  is a false string of symbols, and - - - is a truth-valueless string of symbols.  On the (analog of the) strong Kleene scheme, ‘… and - - -’ is false, whereas it is truth-valueless on the weak one.
^7	  Treating names and natural kind terms as importantly semantically similar is not entirely uncontentious, but it is the received view.
^8	  Earman and Fine (1977) doubt whether Newton’s ‘mass’ really is an example of a multiply denoting term, but since Field has made this example well-known, I nonetheless use it.
^9	  I include ‘determinately’ here to rule out vague predicates.
^10	  I set aside the other leading family of theories of semantic content, Inferential Role Semantics (IRS).  Why?  Fregeanism and DRT take as their central concepts truth and reference (or designation), whereas IRS theories try to do without these concepts, or explain them away.  But the question in the scientific realism debate is standardly couched as ‘Are scientific theories (approximately) true, and do their central theoretical terms refer?’
^11	  As Burton-Roberts says: “Much of the interest in presupposition centres precisely on the use of expressions that cannot be assigned a referent” (1999, 357).
^12	  For example, ‘The present king of France is sitting next to me’ (spoken by me now) seems false, not truth-valueless.  A current defender of the semantic account of presupposition deals with these difficulty and others in (von Fintel 2004).
^13	  Here is Stalnaker’s canonical definition:A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions or has these beliefs. (Stalnaker 1974, 200)
^14	  Some classify this as another type of presupposition failure, e.g. (Soames 1989).
